SEA POWER: THE DECISIVE FACTOR IN 
OUR STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE 



BY 



FRENCH E. CHADWICK 



Reprinted from the Annual Report of the American Historical Association 
for 1915, pages 171-189 




WASHINGTON 
1917 



SEA POWER: THE DECISIVE FACTOR IN 
OUR STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE 



BY 

FKENCH m CHADWICK 



Reprinted from the Annual Eeport of the American Historical Association 
for 1915, pages 171-189 • 




WASHINGTON 
1917 



AS 



9, of D« 
NOV n 1929 



VIII. SEA POWER: THE DECISIVE FACTOR IN OUR STRUGGLE 
FOR INDEPENDENCE. 



By French E. Chad wick, 
Rear Admiral, United States Navy, retired. 



171 



SEA POWER: THE DECISIVE FACTOR IN OUR STRUGGLE FOR 

INDEPENDENCE. 



By French E. Chadwick. 



On October 11-13, 1776, there was a most gallantly contested fight 
on Lake Champlain, in which the American flotilla of 15 small craft, 
carrying about 700 men under Benedict Arnold, was destroyed by 
a British force of much greater strength. Though completely de- 
feated, the mere existence of this force throughout the summer of 
1776 was the chief cause of our success in the Revolution. 

It was thus: Burgoyne was at Quebec in 1776, with an army 
of 13,000 men, intending to advance down the valley of Lake Cham- 
plain and the Hudson and thus to separate New England from the 
rest of the colonies. He was prevented from doing this that year 
through the building of Arnold's flotilla. A similar British force 
had to be prepared to overcome this before Burgoyne could venture, 
and in this work the whole summer passed. Though the struggles 
of October 11 to the 13th resulted in the total destruction of the 
American force, it was for the British a Pyrrhic victory in the larg- 
est sense, for, instead of a triumphal progress by Burgoyne south in 
that year (which but for this action would have been), he was the 
next year to meet the gathering of a resistance by the Americans such 
as was impossible in 1776. He was also to be deprived in 1777 of the 
cooperation of the British forces at New York, two-thirds of their 
total of 22,000 men being carried by Sir William Howe to Philadel- 
phia at the very moment when their cooperation with Burgoyne 
would have ended the war. Burgoyne surrendered at Saratoga on 
October 17, 1777. This surrender brought the French Alliance, 
signed February 6, 1778, and with it the naval support which was a 
sine qua non, to our success. 

There is no use to analyze British conduct in the bringing about of 
Burgoyne's surrender. It 'was military incapacity, pure and simple. 
One can only wonder. 

By April 13, two months after the signing of the French treaty, 
Vice Admiral the Count d'Estaing sailed from Toulon with 12 battle- 
ships and 6 frigates. Never had man a finer chance. Admiral Howe 
was in the Delaware with a much inferior force awaiting the British 

173 



174 



AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 



evacuation of Philadelphia, anxious to cover the transport back to 
New York of the impedimenta of the army impossible to carry by 
land. Had d'Estaing bent his energies to making a more rapid pas- 
sage he would have found Hood in the Delaware, where he could have 
blockaded the latter's far inferior force with part of his own and, 
with the remainder, taken New York, then totally undefended by any 
naval force. The War of the Revolution would have ended then 
and there. But d'Estaing was 33 days in going even the 760 miles 
to Gibraltar. He was 52 from Gibraltar to the Delaware, reaching 
there July 7, 1778. Hood had got to sea nine days before and was 
inside of Sandy Hook, where he prepared for an attack, which 
d'Estaing finally concluded not to make. 

The fiasco of the attack on Newport followed, but here the fault 
was wholly with the Americans. D'Estaing, on request of Gen. Sul- 
livan, lay off the harbor practically quiescent 10 precious days, the 
British meanwhile sinking their ships, and preparing for an attack 
by the fleet which, if made, could have but one result. Sullivan's 
desire to have his own forces (not yet gathered) figure largely, 
caused a fatal delay which ended in Admiral Hood's appearance 
off Point Judith with his fleet the day before the arranged-for 
attack was to come off. D'Estaing, who had now at last entered the 
bay, meeting no resistance of moment, at once went out to meet Hood, 
his inferior in force; but he also met an August gale which dis- 
masted many ships of both fleets, and he went to Boston to refit. He 
sailed thence on November 4, 1778, for the West Indies, a region the 
preservation of which seemed much more important than the United 
States, to both the French and the British and where d'Estaing, now 
in command of the large French naval forces there, met with some 
real success. Such could, however, in no degree compensate for the 
failures on our own coast, which by his departure was left open to 
British attack in its whole length. And it was now attack of the 
most ruthless character. There are few records of warfare more 
brutal than that which now characterized British procedure in Amer- 
ica. The era of Howe pacifism had passed ; and under Clinton, acting 
by specific orders from home, the burning of towns, the slaughter 
of prisoners, the murders by savages (led by British officers) of 
women and children in peaceful frontier settlements surpassed any- 
thing in the history of civilized warfare. It is an era not to be for- 
gotten nor to be weakly condoned. 

In December, 1778, immediately after d'Estaing's departure south, 
the British had occupied Savannah. On October 31, 1779, d'Estaing 
came thither with 22 battleships, landed troops, and was repulsed. 
At the end of two months of abortive effort the great French fleet 
was dispersed in a heavy gale. D'Estaing, leaving the rest of his 
scattered ships to find their way to the West Indies, returned alone 



SEA POWER. 



175 



with his flagship to France, and British armaments were free to 
work their will. 

Very nearly two years of misery were to pass — years of leanness 
and despair in which, but for the mighty and unconquerable spirit 
of Washington, America must have succumbed and returned to 
British allegiance. It is true that on May 2, 1780, the Chevalier 
de Ternay had left France with seven battleships and three frigates, 
convoying a little army of about 5,000 men under the Comte de 
Rochambeau which arrived at Newport on July 11, 1780. But to 
what good? There they stayed for a whole year, able to do noth- 
ing. It was ships which were wanted much more than soldiers. 
This was recognized to the full by Washington himself, who stands 
with Bacon and Raleigh in his appreciation of what sea power 
meant. It took a hundred years more to bring home this truth to the 
minds of men in general, embodied as it was in Washington's memo- 
randum of July 15, 1780, sent to Rochambeau on his arrival at New- 
port by the hands of Lafayette. This memorandum expressed as 
fully this meaning as it was ever declared by anyone. It said, 
referring of course to our own situation of the moment: 

In any operation and under all circumstances a decisive naval superiority 
is to be considered a fundamental principle and the basis upon which every hope 
of success must depend. 

Our southern States were now, as mentioned, ravaged by the 
enemy. Charleston had fallen; the incapable Gates, sent south on 
the strength of the success at Saratoga, which was due, in fact, to 
others, had been totally defeated ; de Ternay's few ships at Newport 
and Rochambeau's lean force of 5,000 men were a nullity in face of 
Britain's naval predominance. Arnold's treason had almost at once 
followed Rochambeau's arrival. De Ternay himself died in Decem- 
ber, 1780, from chagrin, says Lafayette, at the apparently hopeless 
situation. As the months went on and 1781 was reached, Virginia 
was ravaged by troops under Philips and the traitor Arnold. Greene, 
succeeding Gates, was now holding his own in the Carolinas against 
Cornwallis, who suddenly moved into Virginia, which now became 
the main theater of the war. 

It was now that there began a series of events of the most extraor- 
dinary and fortunate character, events which were to change the 
whole aspect of the war, fulfilling Washington's dictum to Rocham- 
beau in the previous year and bringing American independence. 

Comte de Grasse sailed from Brest on March 22, 1781, with 20 
ships of the line as a reenforcement for the French in the West 
Indies. One ship of the line, convoying 600 troops and money for 
Rochambeau's force, was diverted to Newport. A frigate, La Con- 
corde, also separated from de Grasse for Boston, carrying Rocham- 
beau's son, Colonel, the Vicomte de Rochambeau, and the Comte de 



176 



AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 



Barras, ordered to succeed the dead de Ternay. De Barras, who 
arrived at Boston on May 6, 1781, and at Newport on the 10th, 
carried to the Comte de Rochambeau a letter from M. de Castries, 
the minister of marine, informing him that he would receive word 
from the Comte de Grasse when the latter might be expected in 
American waters and saying that de Grasse "has 20 ships; he will 
find 10 at the islands, and you have 8 more to give him. So that, 
as he is master of his own movements, with authority to unite or 
to separate his forces, I trust he may control the American coasts 
for some time to come, and that he may cooperate with you if you 
are projecting any enterprise in the north." 1 

This was the first link of the chain which led to Yorktown. 

The naval and military situations were as follows: Washington 
was on the Hudson with nominally 6,000 men, but in reality not 
more than half that number of effectives. At Newport, R. I., and 
in various neighboring cantonments there were 5,000 French under 
Rochambeau. In Newport Harbor there were eight French battle- 
ships, one having joined from de Grasse's fleet. 

At New York there were some 10,000 British troops, regulars and 
provincials, under Sir Henry Clinton, commander in chief of the 
British land forces in America, and a squadron of 10 battleships 
under Admiral Arbuthnot, who was relieved on July 2 by Rear 
Admiral Thomas Graves. Cornwallis was advancing north into 
Virginia, and on May 20 made junction at Petersburg with the army 
of some 2,400 men, which, until May 13, when he died, was under 
Gen. Philips, with the traitor Arnold second in command. Arnold 
was soon, on the plea of ill health, to go to New York. .Cornwallis's 
command was now some 5,000 men, soon to be increased to about 
7,000. j 

In the West Indies there was a British fleet of 22 battleships under 
Rodney, who was about leaving for England on leave of absence. 
With him as second in command was Sir Samuel Hood. There 
were also four battleships at J amaica. The French force, as has been 
mentioned, was on de Grasse's arrival to be not less than 28 battle- 
ships. Cornwallis's actual presence in Virginia was of course not yet 
known to Washington when, on May 21, he and Rochambeau met 
at Wethersfield to consult over the great news brought by de Barras 
of the expectancy in the North of the French fleet. In the condi- 
tions as they appeared at the moment Washington rather favored an 
attack on New York, Rochambeau leaning to the South. The latter's 
views were strengthened by dispatches to Clinton from Germain, the 
British minister of war, dated the 7th of February and the 7th 
of March captured by a privateer and delivered to Washington at 



1 MS. Letter Books of Rochambeau cited in Tower, The Marquis de La Fayette in the 
American Revolution, II, 283. 



SEA POWEB. 



177 



Wethersfield, showing "that the purpose of the British ministry- 
was to capture the Southern States and after them the Middle States, 
in order to drive the Continental Army to the eastern side of the 
Hudson River." 1 

A campaign of counter operations in the South was an attractive 
proposition from certain points of view. Certainly Washington 
was not the man to stand by and witness the desolation of his native 
State unmoved. But matters were of deep complexity. It was not 
yet known what de Grasse would do. De Barras himself was unwill- 
ing to move to the Chesapeake. The conclusions reached are shown 
in the formal question of Eochambeau and the reply of Washington. 
The former was: 

If the fleets from the West Indies should arrive in these waters, an event 
which will probably be announced beforehand by a frigate, what operations 
will Gen. Washington have in view after a juncture of the French troops with 
his own? 

Washington's reply was to the effect that the enemy at New York 
having been reduced by detachment to less than half the force which 
they had in September, 1780, it was advisable to unite the French 
and American forces on the North Kiver and move to the vicinity 
of New York "to be ready to take advantage of any opportunity 
which the weakness of the enemy may afford. Should the West 
Indian fleet arrive on the coast . . . either proceed in the opera- 
tion against New York " or " against the enemy in some other 
quarter, as circumstances should dictate." The difficulties of a move 
South were dwelt upon and the preference for an operation against 
New York " in the present circumstances over an attempt to send 
a force to the southward " reiterated. 

With this understanding Eochambeau returned to Newport. 

On May 28 Rochambeau, now assured of the intention of the 
French Government that de Grasse should at least at some time 
appear on the coast, wrote a letter to the admiral to go by La Con- 
corde from Boston, saying: 

The enemy is making the most vigorous efforts in Virginia. Cornwallis is 
marching from Wilmington near Cape Fear to join on the Roanoke at Halifax 
with the corps of Philips and Arnold, which goes to make up an army of 
6,000 men at Portsmouth, Va., . . . whence with his small armed vessels he 
ravages all the rivers of Virginia. . . . Gen. Washington is certain that 
there remain at New York but 8,500 regular troops and 3,000 militia. He has 
pressed the Count de Barras to go with the French troops to Chesapeake Bay. 
M. de Barras has shown the impossibility of this. He then pressed for the 
junction of the French army with his own on the North River to co jointly 
menace and perhaps attack New York. M. de Barras says that as soon as the 
army leaves he will go to Boston, following out his orders. There will remain 

1 Tower, op. cit ; Memoirs de Rochambeau (Paris, 1809), I, 278; Sparks, Writings of 
Washington, VIII, 519. 

63871°— 17 12 



178 



AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 



at Newport 500 American militia to hold the works, which the enemy does not 
appear to be in a position to attack. 

Some days since the" English squadron cruised off here five or six days. 
Four of them stood to sea, it is supposed, to return to New York or toward 
the Chesapeake to assist the offensive operations in the South. There are 
seven ships of the line — one of three decks, three seventy-fours, three sixty- 
fours, two fifties, four forty-fours, and many frigates. These last are not 
always with the squadron; they spread themselves about in support of their 
different movements. 

This is the state of things and of the severe crisis in which America finds 
herself, and particularly the States of the South, at this moment. The arrival 
of the Count de Grasse can save it; all our means at hand can do nothing 
without his assistance and the naval superiority which he can bring. 

There are two points at which to act offensively against the enemy — the 
Chesapeake and New York. The southeast winds and the distress of Virginia 
will probably cause you to prefer the Chesapeake Bay, and it is there where 
we think you can render the greatest service ; besides, it would take you only 
two days to come to New York. In any case it is essential to send us, well in 
advance, a frigate to forewarn the Comte de Barras as to the place at which 
you will land, as also Gen. Washington, in order that the first may join you 
and the second may support you with the land forces. 

Rochambeau added a postscript three days later, informing de 
Grasse that Barras had decided to remain at Newport. This de- 
cision was the result of a council of war made up of officers of both 
Army and Navy. 

On June 10 arrived at Boston the ship of the line Sagittaire, bring- 
ing a letter dated March 29 from de Grasse himself to Rochambeau : 

His Majesty, Monsieur, has confided to me the command of the naval forces 
which he has destined to protect his possessions in Southern America [the West 
Indies] and those of his allies in the north. The forces I command are suffi- 
cient to satisfy the views as to the offensive which it is in the interest of the 
allied powers to carry out in order to bring an honorable peace. . . . 

He requested to be informed at Santo Domingo, " where I shall be 
at the end of June," of the British naval forces, north; requested 
that word be sent by several despatch vessels; and ended by saying 
that it would be toward the 15th of July at the earliest that he could 
reach our coast; "but it is necessary," he added, "seeing the short 
time I can stay in the country, which in any event the season will 
force me to leave, that everything which can serve in the success of 
your projects shall not delay action a moment." 

Rochambeau replied the day of the reception of the letter, June 11, 
informing de Grasse that Washington had written him four letters 
since his previous writing on May 28, pressing him to move, that he 
expected to join in five or six days and try in menacing New York 
to make a diversion in favor of Virginia. He continued : 

I can not conceal from you that Washington has not half the troops he 
counted on having, and I believe, though he is reticent on this, that he has not 
at present 6,000 men ; that M. de la Fayette has not 1,000 regular troops, includ- 
ing the militia, to defend Virginia, and about as many more on the way to 



SEA POWER. 



179 



join him. ... It is then of the greatest consequence that you take aboard 
all the troops you can ; 4,000 or 5,000 would not be too many, to attack the force 
at Hampton Roads and then to force the Hook, the land troops taking possession 
of Sandy Hook which would facilitate the entry of the fleet over the bar. We 
are sure the Sandtvich, Rodney's flagship in September, and the London. 
Graves's flagship more lately, have entered and gone out; finally, in order to 
aid us after the siege of Brooklyn, supposing we are able to establish ourselves 
with 8,000 men at this point of Long Island, keeping 5,000 or 6,000 at North 
River to mask King's Bridge. I point out, Monsieur, the different objects you 
can have in view and the actual and grievous picture of affairs in this country. 
I am sure you will bring there a maritime superiority, but I can not too often 
repeat to bring also troops and money. 

He repeated also the necessity of forewarning Barras and Wash- 
ington, and added a postscript : 

I observe by a letter which the Chevalier de la Luzerne has written you that 
M. Washington appears to wish you to land first at the .Hook in front of New 
York, in order to cut off Arbuthnot's squadron from anchoring there. I subordi- 
nate my opinion to his, as I am bound to do ; but our latest advices indicate that 
the enemy's squadron, after having anchored for several days outside the Hook, 
has put to sea and gone toward the South. 1 

" This letter," says Tower, " and the one which Gen. de Rocham- 
beau wrote in the last days of May are, with regard to their results, 
among the most important historical documents of the Revolution, 
for they laid the basis upon which was established the cooperation of 
the allied forces in the Yorktown campaign." 2 

This correspondence and the minutes of the Wethersfleld meeting, 
May 21 and 22, show very clearly the minds of both the American and 
French commanders. Washington saw in New York the central 
stronghold of the British power, in which, of course, he was correct. 
Cornwallis, supposedly still in North Carolina, threatened Virginia, 
but if the allies should move thither, he would be immediately heavily 
reinforced from New York, and with the British fleet holding Chesa- 
peake Bay and its affluences, it was hopeless to expect any good re- 
sult. On the other hand, a demonstration against New York would, 
as shown by Clinton's certainty of being attacked and his anxiety for 
reinforcements of not less than 3,000 men from Cornwallis, 3 have 
relieved the pressure in the South. The main objective, viewed from 
the standpoint of the twentieth century, was New York. A series of 
fortuitous circumstances simply made the southern movement more 
advisable. In the whole there was a wonderful element of luck. 

It is thus in no sense derogatory, but otherwise, to Washington's 
judgment that he was at first inclined to a naval attack upon New 

x For this correspondence, see H. Doniol, Histoire de la Participation de la France a 
l'fitablispement des fitats Unis d'Amerique (1892), V, 488-490. Appendix, Correspondence 
of Comte de Rochambeau. 

•Tower, II, 400. 

•See dispatch, Clinton to Cornwallis, June 11, 1781, Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy, 
II, 18-23. 



180 



AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 



York, should the fleet arrive, rather than adventure south with no 

such objective as was shortly to offer itself, for it was not until July 
13 that Washington was able to inform Rochambeau that, by infor- 
mation received on the 3d, Cornwallis was between Richmond and 
Fredericksburg, " free from his superiority of force to go where he 
would." It is clear from the conference of July 19 that even at that 
date Washington regarded New York as the most important objective 
for the fleet if all conditions of time of arrival, length of stay, etc., 
should be favorable. 1 Some, including Doniol and the present hon- 
ored French ambassador to the United State, M. Jusserand, have 
raised the question as to the initiator of the move against Cornwallis. 
They have not recognized that they are doing an injustice to Rocham- 
beau's memory in supposing an over-hasty advocacy of a transfer of 
the allied armies to the south. It is an unnecessary and futile claim. 
It was a matter decided by the trend of events and by the final greater 
ease of the proposition. It is scarcely amiss to say that de Grasse 
naturally leaned to what appeared the less difficult for the fleet. 
D'Estaing's failure at New York was still very fresh in mind and the 
incomparably greater ease of access to the Chesapeake if no British 
fleet was in occupancy was not to be denied. Washington and 
Rochambeau worked indeed in finest accord and with absolute single- 
ness of purpose. The noble self-effacement of Rochambeau deserves 
all praise. He placed himself entirely at Washington's command. 
In his own words, " Vous ferez de moi ce que vous voudrez." 2 

On June 18, 1781, a year less 23 days from its arrival in America, 
the French Army, leaving some 430 artillerymen and all their siege 
guns to support Barras's squadron in case it should be attacked, 
started toward the Hudson to join Washington, who, by July 4, oc- 
cupied a line from Dobbs Ferry to White Plains. The French 
arrived and occupied the east end of the line on July 6. 

Clinton, apprehensive of attack, was desirous that Cornwallis 
should send back to New York some of the 7,724 troops sent to Vir- 
ginia between October, 1780, and June, 1781. Cornwallis, who now 
moved to Portsmouth, Va., declared, however, that it was impossible 
to hold his own in Virginia with less than the force he had with 
him, which now, with a late reinforcement of 1,700, amounted as 
mentioned to over 7,000 men. The selection of a point d'appui was 
ordered, Old Point Comfort being specially named. The engineer 
and naval officer who inspected the position declared against it, and 
the main body of Cornwallis's force finally left the vicinity of Nor- 
folk for York River on July 30, and the whole force was at York- 
town and Gloucester by August 20. 

The Concorde did not leave Boston until June 20. She had a swift, 
safe passage to Cape Francois. De Grasse had left Fort Ro3^al, Marti- 



1 Minutes of Conference, Doniol, V 516. 



> Doniol, IV, 680. 



SEA POWER. 



181 



nique, on July 5. He arrived at Cape Francois on July 26, where he 
found four ships of the line left there the year before by Guichen. On 
August 12 the Concorde, carrying de Grasse's reply dated July 28, 
reached Newport, and two days later his letter was in the hands of 
Rochambeau and Washington. De Grasse announced his intention 
to leave on August 3 (it was two days later that he sailed) for the 
Chesapeake : 

The point which appears to me to be indicated by you, Monsieur le Comte, and 
by M. Washington, de Luzerne, and de Barras, as the one from which the advan- 
tage you propose may be most certainly attained. 

He had engaged at Habana the 1,200,000 livres requested by 
Rochambeau; had arranged to embark 3,000 infantrymen, 100 artil- 
lerymen, 100 dragoons, 10 field pieces, a number of siege guns and 
mortars, part of the Santo Domingo garrison,*all under the command 
of the Marquis de Saint Simon. He announced that he could only 
remain upon our coast until October 15, on account of operations 
planned by the allied French and Spanish officers. He had acted 
wholly on his own responsibility and could not venture to change 
their arrangements by delay beyond the time set. 

On August 5 de Grasse left Cape Hatien with 28 ships of the line, 
and, going by way of the Old Bahama Channel, anchored his fleet in 
three columns on August 30 just within the capes of the Chesapeake. 
Barras, five days before, had left Newport with 6 ships of the line, 4 
frigates, and 18 French and American transports; and Cornwallis, 
as mentioned, only 10 days before had completed the removal of 
his force from Portsmouth to Yorktown. He had, in addition to his 
army, about 1,000 seamen belonging to several frigates and smaller 
men-of-war, and a considerable number of transports. 

Washington had broken camp on August 19, five days after the re- 
ception of the news of de Grasse's departure. He crossed the Hudson 
at King's Ferry on August 21. By the 25th both armies were across. 
The march south began with every caution against a revelation of 
destination, and with endeavor to give the impression to the British 
of a contemplated attack on Staten Island. Clinton was completely 
misled. The Delaware was forded at Trenton, and on September 5, 
the day of Graves's arrival off the capes of the Chesapeake, the Army 
reached Philadelphia, where Washington had arrived six days before. 
The march was continued thence to the head of Elk at the north end 
of Chesapeake Bay. 

The Continental Army which marched south under Washington 
numbered only 2,000 men. The French were 4,000. Celerity was of 
the utmost importance, for if Lafayette failed to hold Cornwallis, and 
he should escape to North Carolina, the situation would be of the 
most serious character. The aid of the 3,000 troops under Saint 
Simon brought from Santo Domingo, which de Grasse had at once, 



182 



AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 



after communicating with Lafayette, sent into the James River, was 
now of greatest value. These, landed at Jamestown on September 2, 
effectually settled the question of Cornwallis's retreat southward. 

Washington was at this moment at Philadelphia, whence on Sep- 
tember 2 he wrote Lafayette : 

Distressed beyond measure to know what had become of the Comte de Grasse, 
and for fear that the English fleet [which he now knew had left Sandy Hook on 
August 31] by occupying the Chesapeake, toward which my accounts say they 
were steering, may frustrate all our flattering prospects in that quarter, I am 
also not a little solicitous for the Comte de Barras, who was to have sailed from 
Rhode Island on the 23d ultimo, and from whom I have heard nothing since that 
time. 1 

Washington left Philadelphia on September 5 for the head of 
Elk. His anxiety would have been still greater had he known that 
at that moment de Grasse was getting underway to leave the bay and 
fight a battle with Graves. 

As to the British fleet : On July 2 Admiral Arbuthnot had sailed 
for England, leaving Rear Admiral Graves in command. On the 
same day the latter wrote a letter to Rodney which he sent by the brig 
Active, saying that intercepted dispatches showed that a heavy reen- 
forcement was expected from the West Indies to cooperate with de 
Barras's squadron at Newport in operations on the American coast. 
But Rodney was already informed, and on July 7, then at Bar- 
bados, he wrote the admiral at New York: 

As the enemy has at this time a fleet of 28 sail of the line at Martinique, a 
part of which is reported to be destined for North America, I have dispatched 
His Majesty's sloop Swallow to acquaint you therewith and inform you that 
I shall keep as good a lookout as possible on their motions, by which my own 
shall be regulated. 

In case of my sending a squadron to America I shall order it to make the 
capes of Virginia and proceed along the coast to the capes of the Delaware, 
and from thence to Sandy Hook unless the intelligence it may receive from 
you should induce it to act otherwise. 

The enemy's squadron destined for America will sail, I am informed, in a 
short time ; but whether they call at Cape Frangois, I can not learn ; however, 
you may depend upon the squadron in America being reenforced should the 
enemy bend their force that way. 

Two days later Rodney received word that de Grasse had left 
Martinique. He then gave Sir Samuel Hood preparatory orders 
to leave for the north, he himself understanding that de Grasse was 
to take with him but 14 ships. Thus the orders, dated St. Eustatius, 
July 25, 1781, directed Hood to proceed with 14 ships of the line and 
7 frigates, convoying " the trade " as far as Cape Tiberon (the 
southwest corner of Haiti), send the convoy to Jamaica and then: 

Having seen the said convoy in safety as above, you are to make the best of 
your way toward the coasts of North America with the remainder of the 
line-of -battle ships, together with [four frigates named], which you are to 



1 Sparks, Writings of Washington, VIII, 150. 



SEA POWER. 



183 



employ in such manner should you be senior officer on that station (or until 
you come under the command of such), as shall seem to you most conducive 
to His Majesty's service by supporting His Majesty's liege subjects, an/1 
annoying his rebellious ones, and counteracting such schemes as it may be 
reasonable to conclude are formed for the junction of the French fleet from 
Cape Francois with that already there, or with the forces of the rebels in 
America, having lately sent an express to Admiral Arbuthnot, or the com- 
manding officer on that station, that the ships I might either bring or detach 
from thence thither would endeavour first to make the capes of the Chesapeake, 
then those of the Delaware, and so on, to Sandy Hook, unless intelligence 
received from his cruisers (whom I desired might be looking out off the 
first capes) or elsewhere should induce a contrary conduct. 1 

It is clear from the foregoing that Rodney did not expect Hood 
to take even all his 14 ships of the line. Certain reports delayed 
Hood, and these orders were not executed in detail, the outcome 
being that while on August 1 Rodney sailed for England on leave 
of absence, taking with him 4 ships of the line, Hood on August 
10 sailed directly from Antigua for the capes of the Chesapeake. 

It is the " ifs " which count in war as in everything else, and there 
was a momentous one in the events of this period in Rodney's seizure 
of the Dutch island of St. Eustatius as one of the first acts of the 
newly declared war with Holland. This island had been the great 
base of supply of the United States whither not only neutral ships 
carried their cargoes but many English as well who did not disre- 
gard such chances to turn a dishonest penny. In conjunction with 
the army under Gen. Vaughan, Rodney seized the island on Feb- 
ruary 3, 1781. The booty was immense, being valued at over 
£3,000,000. It was Rodney's undoing. He became so entangled in 
the distribution and in the resulting lawsuits, that worry brought 
on his old enemy, the gout, which made such serious inroads on his 
health that he decided to go to England to take the waters of Bath, 
and to look after his interests which had been so severely assailed. 
St. Eustatius thus became a large psychic element in determining the 
result of the war. Had Rodney remained — had he himself gone to 
the American coast, taking his available ships, it is not unfair to 
suppose another turn of events. 

But all the gods of Olympus were, for the moment, with the French 
and Americans. The Swallow, sent by Rodney with the dispatch just 
given, arrived at New York on July 27, but Graves, with informa- 
tion from the Admiralty of a convoy from France for Boston, had 
sailed for Boston Bay on July 21. Dispatched thither, the Swallow 
was forced ashore on Long Island and lost. The Active, sent by 
Graves to the West Indies with the information given above, reached 
Hood on August 3 ; was dispatched back to New York on the 6th ; and 
was captured on the way. Graves did not return to New York until 
August 16, when he found a copy which had been made of Rodney's 



1 In full in G. B. Mundy, Idle and Correspondence of the late Admiral Lord Rodney, 
II, 14&-149. 



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AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 



dispatch, but this only notified him that a force would be sent and of 
its course, not that it had started. On August 25 Hood was off the 
entrance to the Chesapeake, and he now wrote to Graves : 

Herewith you will receive a duplicate of the letter I had the honor to write 
you by Lieut. Delanoe, of the Active brig, lest any misfortune may have befallen 
her in returning to you. 

I am now steering for Cape Henry, in order to examine the Chesapeake. From 
thence I shall proceed off the capes of the Delaware and, not seeing or hearing 
anything of de Grasse or any detachment of ships he might have sent upon this 
coast, shall then make the best of my way off Sandy Hook, where I shall be 
permitted to anchor or not, as may appear most advisable to you. Annexed is 
my line of battle . . . 

This, carried by the Nymphe, arrived at New York on August 28, 
and Hood's fleet, which Graves states never sighted the capes of the 
Chesapeake, anchored off the Hook at 2 a. m. the next day, Wednes- 
day, August 29, 1781. 

The inability of Graves and Clinton to grasp the situation is shown 
in a letter from Graves to Hood written on August 28 : 

I have this moment received your letter by the Nymphe acquainting me of 
your intention in coming here with the fleet under your command. It was not 
until yesterday that I had any information of your having sailed, which came 
privately from Lieut. Delanoe, now prisoner at Philadelphia, taken on his pas- 
sage to this place ; . . . We have as yet no certain intelligence of de Grasse ; 
the accounts say that he was gone to the Havana to join the Spaniards and 
expected together upon this coast; a little time will show us. I have sent 
up for pilots to bring your squadron over the bar, which should be buoyed to 
render it safe. To anchor without would neither be safe at this season of the 
year nor prudent on account of its being quite exposed to an enemy, as well as 
the violence of the sea. 

De Barras's squadron was still at Rhode Island by our last accounts, ready 
for sea . . . All the American accounts are big with the expectations and 
the Army has lately crossed to the southward of the Hudson and appears in 
motion in the Jerseys as if to threaten Staten Island. For my own part I be- 
lieve the mountain in labor ; only now that you are come. 

My squadron is slender and not yet ready to move, or I should not hesitate 
upon your coming over the bar. As we are circumstanced, it is a clear point. I 
met the general to-day at Denis's, Long Island. 1 

On the reception of this letter Hood pulled the long distance to 
Wenis's in the afternoon of the 29th. He there told Graves that it 
was not right for him to go within the Hook ; " for whether you at- 
tend the arm to Rhode Island or seek the enemy at sea, you have no 
time to lose; every moment is precious." Graves promised to be 
over the bar next day. That evening word was received that Barras 
had put to sea from Newport with all his ships and transports. 2 In 
the evening of September 1 8 Graves crossed the bar with only his 
5 available ships, and the united armaments at once stood south. 

l The Barham Papers, I, 121, 122. 

■ Hood to Barham. The Barham Papers, I, 130. 

•Log of London. 



SEA POWEE. 



185 



There were in all 19 ships of the line. At 9.30 a. m. of September 
5 the fleet now off the Chesapeake Capes sighted the French fleet at 
anchor just inside Cape Henry. It had taken over 3J days to 
come 240 nautical miles. Signal was now made, says the log of 
the London. " for the line of battle ahead at 2 cables length (1,440 
feet). At noon, Cape Henry, W. J S., 4 or 5 leages." 

De Grasse had sent 4 of his ships of the line into the bay to 
watch Cornwallis's movements, and he had now but 24. About 9.30 
a. m. on this eventful day of September 5 his outermost ships sig- 
naled a fleet in the east. At 1.15 the lookouts aloft reported 24 
ships, and at 11 the lookout frigate Aigrette reported 30, the actual 
number being 28, made up of 19 ships of the line, a 50-gun ship, 6 
frigates, and a fire ship. The French had gone to quarters and the 
admiral had signaled to get underway, without further signal, at 
noon, when it was expected that the flood tide which had set at 7 
would have slackened. At 12.30 the signal was made to form line of 
battle promptly without reference to particular stations. 

The distance from Cape Charles on the north to Cape Henry is 
about 10 nautical miles. The channel for heavy ships, however, is 
confined to a breadth of some 3 miles between Cape Henry and a 
large shoal known as the Middle Ground. In this channel were 
anchored the French ships in three columns. The tide, says the 
captain of the Citoyen (a name markedly indicative of the new 
French sentiment), was still setting strong on Cape Henry, and sev- 
eral of the ships had to tack to clear the cape. The Citoyen cleared 
the cape at 1.45, the Ville de Paris a little in advance. The former 
ship, through absentees on boat duty ashore, the sick, and those who 
had died, was short some 200 men and 5 officers. There were not men 
enough to man the upper-deck guns. Much the same may be said of 
the others of the fleet. 

The two forces now to be opposed were British — 2 ninety-eights 
(3 deckers), 12 seventy-fours (2 deckers), 1 seventy, 4 sixty-fours, 
and 7 frigates. These 19 ships of the line carried nominally 1,410 
guns, though probably quite 100 more. The French were 1 one 
hundred and fours (a 3 decker presented by the city of Paris, and so 
named, the finest ship of her day), 3 eighties, 17 seventy-fours, and 3 
sixty-fours, with nominally 1,794, or probably nearer 2,000 guns. 
There were also 2 frigates. The odds were thus strongly against the 
British. But it is clear that under such circumstances as those just 
mentioned, the French ships must have left the capes in very strag- 
gling order, offering conditions which more than nullified the dis- 
crepancy of force. It was a great opportunity. Had Graves had 
initiative and had not been hidebound by the old fighting instruc- 
tions, which required the formation of line ahead and each ship to 



186 AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 

engage her opposite, he would have at once stood down and destroyed 
the French van before the French line could have been formed. 

At 1 p. m. Graves had formed his line on an east and west bear- 
ing, heading west, the distance between ships being 1 cable (720 
feet). On approaching the Middle Ground he wore together (2.15 
p. m.) (thus heading eastward) and lay to in order to let the center 
of the French " come abreast of us " (the London, flagship, being in 
the center of the British line as was the Villa de Paris in that of the 
French). The van was signaled at 2.30 to keep more to starboard; 
the signal was repeated at 3.17 ; and at 3.30 the rear of the fleet was 
ordered to make more sail. At 3.34 the van was again ordered to 
keep more to starboard, and at 3.46 signal was made for line ahead, 
" the enemy's ships advancing very slow." Evening was now ap- 
proaching and signal was made " to bear down and engage their op- 
ponents." The flagship filled the main topsail, bore down, and at 
4.03 repeated the signal, and at 4.11 hauled down the signal for line 
ahead " so as not to interfere with the signal to engage close." Sig- 
nal for the line ahead was repeated at 4.22. It was hauled down at 
4.27 and that for close action again made. This was repeated at 5.20, 
upon which the rear (Admiral Hood) bore down toward the enemy. 
The French rear, however, kept at such a distance that the British 
rear did not get into action at all. At 6.30 all firing ceased and both 
fleets stood eastward, the lines being about 3 miles apart. The British 
had had 90 killed and 246 wounded; the French reported a total of 
about 200 casualties. But the damages to a number of the British 
ships were such that Graves did not again engage. The Terrible (74) 
was in sinking condition, and five days later had to be burned. Nor 
did the French show any inclination to renew the battle. For five 
days the two fleets were more or less in sight, sometimes only from the 
masthead. On the 10th the French fleet bore, by the London's log, 
east-northeast " 5 or 6 miles," though the journal of the French ship 
of the line Citoyen of the same day makes the British not visible, 
showing thus how widely scattered the ships of each fleet were. Cape 
Henry was north-northwest, distant " 35 leagues." 

It was now that the purpose for which they had come, which 
seems, temporarily at least, to have escaped the minds of both com- 
manders, came again into the consciousness of de Grasse and he 
stood for the capes, within which he again anchored on the 11th, 
taking off the capes the British frigates Iris (formerly the American 
Hancock) and Richmond. De Grasse found Barras anchored in the 
bay. He had arrived on the evening of the 10th with all his fleet 
intact. The French had now 36 of the line — an overpowering force 
as against the British, even should we include a reinforcement of six 
ships of the line just arrived at New York under Admiral Digby — 
news which came near sending de Grasse again to sea in search of the 



SEA POWEB. 



187 



enemy. It required the strongest protestations of Washington to 
hold him to the real purpose of the campaign. 

Thus both the French and British commanders showed how little 
they comprehended the real strategy of the situation. Graves did 
his best, but it was a fatally bad best. He should, having a leading 
wind, have attacked the French as they made their exit, when they 
were necessarily in disorder and while but a portion were outside. 1 
It was an astonishing tribute to conservatism bred through the hard 
and fast rules of the fighting instructions. 

That Graves desired " close action " by the whole line is sufficiently 
clear, and it is comprehensible that his orders, though marred by the 
signal " line ahead," were not carried out. Sir Samuel Hood (later 
Lord Hood) was undoubtedly one of the most capable officers of his 
time. Though he did not do what was evidently the obvious thing 
and was thus seriously culpable, he was wise enough after the event, 
and expressed himself in a private letter to Jackson, an official of the 
admiralty, in terms which were an epitome on this occasion of good 
tactics and good sense. The letter was as follows : 

Coast of Vieginia, 6th of September, 1781. 

Yesterday the British fleet had a rich and most plentiful harvest of glory in 
view, but the means to gather it were omitted in more instances than one. 

I may begin with observing that the enemy's van was not very closely attacked 
as it came out of Lynn Haven Bay, which, I think, might have been done with 
clear advantage, as they came out by no means in a regular and connected way. 
When the enemy's van was out it was greatly extended beyond the center and 
rear and might have been attacked with the whole force of the British fleet. 
Had such an attack been made, several of the enemy's ships must have been in- 
evitably demolished in half an hour's action, and there was a full hour and a 
half to have engaged it before any of the rear could have come up. 

Thirdly. When the van of the two fleets got into action, and the ships of the 
British line were hard pressed, one (the Shrewsbury) totally disabled very 
early from keeping her station by having her fore and main topsail yards shot 
away, which left her second (the Intrepid) exposed to two ships of superior 
force, which the noble and spirited behavior of Capt. Molloy 1 obliged to turn 
their sterns to him, that the signal was not thrown out for the van ships to make 
more sail to have enabled the center to push on to the support of the van, instead 
of engaging at such an improper distance (the London having her main topsail 
to the mast the whole time she was firing with the signal for the line at half a 
cable flying), that the second ship astern of the London received but trifling 
damage, and the third astern of her (the London) received no damage at all, 
which most clearly proves how much too great the distance was the center divi- 
sion engaged. 

Now, had the center gone to the support of the van, and the signal for the line 
been hauled down, or the commander in chief had set the example of close action, 
even with the signal for the line flying, the van of the enemy must have been 
cut to pieces, and the rear division of the British fleet would have been opposed 
to those ships the center division fired at, and at the proper distance for engaging, 

1 London's log. 

• This is the Capt. Molloy who afterwards, in a less " happy hour of command," incurred 
bo much discredit on the 1st of June, 1794. 



188 



AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 



or the rear admiral who commanded it would have a great deal to answer for. 
Instead of that, our center division did the enemy but little damage, and our rear 
ships being barely within random shot, three only fired a few shot. So soon as 
the signal for the line was hauled down at 25 minutes after 5, the rear division 
bore up, above half a mile to leeward of the center division, but the French ships 
bearing up also, it did not near them ; and at 25 minutes after 6 the signal of 
the line ahead at half a cable being again hoisted, and the signal for battle 
hauled down, Rear Admiral Sir S. Hood called to the Monarch (his leader) to 
keep her wind, as he dared not separate his division just at dark, the London not 
bearing up at all. 

N. B. — This forenoon Capt. Everett came on board the Barfleur with a message 
from Rear Admiral Graves to Rear Admiral Sir S. Hood desiring his opinion 
whether the action should be renewed. Sir Samuel's answer was : " I dare say 
Mr Graves will do what is right. I can send no opinion, but whenever he (Mr. 
Graves) wishes to see me, I will wait upon him with great pleasure." 

Hood then wrote Graves : 

Barfleue, at sea, 10th September, 1781. 
Sir : I flatter myself you will forgive the liberty I take in asking whether you 
have any knowledge where the French fleet is, as we can see nothing of it from 
the Barfleur. 

By the press of sail de Grasse carried yesterday (and he must even have 
done the same the preceding night, by being where [he] was at daylight), I am 
inclined to think his aim is the Chesapeake, in order to be strengthened by the 
ships there, either by adding to his present force, or by exchanging his disabled 
ships for them. Admitting that to be his plan, will he not cut off the frigates 
you have sent to reconnoiter, as well as the ships you expect from New York? 
And if he should enter the bay, which is by no means improbable, will he not 
succeed in giving most effectual succor to the rebels? 1 

It is impossible, however, to avoid the impression that Hood did 
not do his duty as, had he been in chief command, he would have 
expected a subordinate to do. Whether there was a temporary petti- 
ness of mind arising from a rather unconcealed contempt of Graves 
or whatever else the cause, he did not whole-heartedly aid his chief. 
The journal of the Barfleur, his flagship, says at " 31 minutes past 
3 the Admiral made the Sig 1 to the Fleet to Alter the Course to Star- 
board." The signal for " close action " was flying, and this was 
Hood's opportunity. Instead he chose to consider that he was to 
hold the line, and thus scarcely got into action at all. It was not 
until 5.20, when the signal for close action was repeated (that for 
the line having been hauled down at 4.27), that Hood stood down, 
but the ships of the French rear bearing up also, he did not get near 
enough to accomplish anything. Certainly his conduct aided largely 
to the losing of the day for the British. 

His last sentence is curiously suggestive of the general " woolli- 
iiess" of idea as to the duty of the British fleet. Its true strategy 
was to take advantage of the leading wind with which it approached 
the Chesapeake, and upon the straggling exit of the French fleet to 



1 Letters written by Sir Samuel Hood, Navy Records Society, vol. Ill, 31-33. 



SEA POWEB. 



189 



have stood into the Capes. With but the van of the French fleet out- 
side, with the others in the disorder of exit against a flood tide, there 
was the assurance of victory for the British, of the occupancy of the 
bay, and the relief of Cornwallis. Everything favored such a course 
of action. Failing this, it should, from the British point of view, 
have been Graves who should, after the action, have gone into the 
Chesapeake and left de Grasse aimlessly sailing about. Whether the 
latter would have had the boldness to have then attacked New York, 
which was wholly undefended, is a question. 

On the day of the action, September 5, Washington was standing 
on the river bank at Chester. 1 " He waved his hat in the air as the 
Comte de Rochambeau approached, and with many demonstrations 
of uncontrollable happiness he announced to him the good news " of 
de Grasse's arrival. Had he known that de Grasse was leaving the 
capes at that moment to fight a battle he would have been less joyous. 
But the fates were with the allies. It was an incapable British 
admiral that saved the situation and brought De Grasse back to a 
position he should never have left. As it was, by September 28 the 
combined armies were in front of Yorktown, partly transported from 
the headwaters of the Chesapeake by French frigates sent to An- 
napolis, partly by the ordinary land route; and the loss of Corn- 
wallis with his 7,000 men, and the complete restoration of conti- 
nental authority in the South had become a certainty. The surren- 
der took place on October 19. On the same day Graves, who had 
after the action, returned to New York, again crossed Sandy Hook 
bar, now with 23 ships, convoying Clinton with 7,000 troops bound 
for the Chesapeake. They arrived off the Capes on October 24. 
They there received word of Cornwallis's surrender. In any case the 
expedition was futile. The French were in 50 per cent greater force, 
and an attack could only end in disaster. The fleet and troops could 
only again return to New York. 

The fact that Washington marched south with but 2,000 Conti- 
nentals and 4,000 French alone shows the supreme importance of the 
French fleet. Without it there had been no American independence. 
There could have been no more complete indication of Washington's 
dictum, that " In any operation, and under all circumstances, a de- 
cisive naval superiority is to be considered a fundamental principle 
and the basis upon which every hope of success must depend." 



» Tower, II, 441. 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 




011 782 295 3 



